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This dissertation has five main purposes. First, to gather literature on the discount rates 
used by public entities and governments to assess PPP projects. Second, to typify 
descriptively the models used to calculate these discount rates. The most used models 
are: the Social Time Preference rate (STPR), the Social Opportunity Cost of Capital 
(SOCC), a weighted average between STPR and SOCC, and the long-term government 
bond. Third, to compare the usage in different countries and to analyze implications of 
different usage in Portugal. In order to analyze these implications in Portugal, several 
discount rates are calculated using these previous methods. Then, these are used to 
discount the future payments regarding the 36 PPP projects operating in Portugal. The 
differences in the NPVs are analyzed. Amongst the major results, if one used the SOCC 
method there would have been a lighter burden to the State. Fifth, the Portuguese case 
in PPPs is carefully discussed. The debate on payments to PPPs and the discount rate 
issue is addressed. The fact that PPPs allow shifting financial responsibilities to the 
future, linked with the lack of a risk assessment to the contracts led to the enormous 
burden to the State. Since 2003, the Portuguese legal rate is fixed at 6.08%, based on the 
10-year government bond, and by today there is no update. Therefore, this dissertation 
suggests a new rate. When discounting PPP payments, the risk-free rate adjusted for 
systematic risk should be used, whereas if the project is done entirely by the public 
sector we recommend the risk-free only. 
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For a long time private firms have been involved in public service delivering, but 
Public-Private Partnerships came to give a whole new meaning to the roles of the public 
and private sectors in the early 1990s. They are first dated from U.K. but are currently 
implemented all over the world.  
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are defined as “arrangements where the private 
sector supplies infrastructure assets and services that traditionally have been provided 
by the government. In addition to private execution and financing of public investment, 
PPPs have two other important characteristics: there is an emphasis on service 
provision, as well as investment, by the private sector; and significant risk is transferred 
from the government to the private sector. PPPs are involved in a wide range of social 
and economic infrastructure projects, but they are mainly used to build and operate 
hospitals, schools, prisons, roads, bridges and tunnels, light rail networks, air traffic 
control systems, and water and sanitation plants”. (IMF 2004:4 and 2006:1)  
Since 1993 with Vasco da Gama Bridge, Portugal has been investing in these 
projects and by today has already implemented 36 PPPs in numerous sectors. The 
Portuguese Government is responsible for 3% of 1340 PPPs in Europe and further 
calculations by Sarmento and Reis (2012) conclude that Portugal is the leading country 
in using PPPs. Portugal has used PPPs to build an extensive highway network. Two 
waves were launched in the road sector: the first consists of seven SCUTS 
1
contracted 
between 1999 and 2001. These highways were originally funded by the Government 
using shadow tolls but, between October 2010 and April 2011, renegotiations were done 
to prevent most of the impact on public accounts and, from then on tolls were 
implemented. The second wave of road sector PPPs was launched between 2007 and 
2009. With these investments, Portugal had 2,700km of highways back in 2012 placing 
it among the countries with the highest highway density in Europe (Cruz, 2011).  
 
                                                          
1
 SCUT is short for the Portuguese “Sem Custos Para o Utilizador” (Without Costs for the User), 
nowadays referred to as ex-SCUTs, since these projects are currently tolled 
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Moreover, there are already four hospitals implemented as PPPs: Braga, Cascais, 




The biggest motivation to implement such contracts is to achieve Value for Money 
(VfM).  This feature is the cost saving benefit of having two parties providing the public 
service and is reached by sharing the risks of the project. Although, there must be a 
proper allocation of the risks so that each risk is managed by the party that is best able 
to handle it. If there are substantially few risks allocated to the private sector, they 
would feel demotivated to perform the project while, on the other hand, too many risks 
would yield a higher risk premium for the private side and large payments would make 
it too costly for the State. In this case, VfM would not be achieved (Morallos and 
Amekudzi, 2008). 
In order to test whether a PPP project achieves VfM, there is a tool that must be 
carried out: The Public Sector Comparator (PSC). This model uses estimates of risks, 
revenues and costs set into cash-flows and, using a public sector discount rate discounts 
them to an NPV. According to Morallos and Amekudzi (2008), this public sector 
discount rate has a great impact in the result and should be calculated properly.  
 
What we propose to do in this paper is to review existing literature on discount 
rates and identify the most commonly used methods to calculate them. By following 
these methods, we apply the theories to Portugal’s case. These methods are: the Social 
Time Preference Rate (STPR); the Social Opportunity Cost of Capital (SOCC); The 
Weighted Average between STPR and SOCC; the Long-term Portuguese borrowing 
rate; the Long-term German borrowing rate associated with the Eurozone currency, 
which is considered to be less risky. 
Using these methodologies, several discount rates will be calculated for Portugal 
between the years 2005 and 2013. Furthermore, using these discount rates, the NPV of 
the 36 PPPs operating in Portugal will be calculated for the same years. The purpose 
will be to descriptively analyze and compare the different NPVs, using the different 
discount rates, with the NPV using the Portuguese current discount rate also during the 
same time frame.  
3 
 
Our study concludes that if one uses the SOCC rate, there would have been a 
lighter burden to the Portuguese public accounts between 2005 and 2013.  While it is 
undoubtedly better to pay less to the private sector, there are ethical implications of 
using a discount rate to save on public expense. As it is known, using a discount rate on 
future payments is an accounting operation and, a higher rate can be used only to report 
a smaller present value of the debt. However, the discount rate should represent the 
exact nature of a country’s risk and should not be used merely to save on public 
expense. This being said, it should be emphasized that contingent liabilities to PPP 
contracts are not reported as part of the public debt. So the incentive to inflate the rate to 
reduce the perception of the debt does not exist. 
 
Moreover, the Portuguese context in PPPs is addressed. One of the major concerns 
regarding PPPs in Portugal is the weight that future payments represent to the public 
sector. As it was previously mentioned, a suitable risk allocation between the two 
parties is crucial to deliver VfM which did not happen in the shadow tolls roads in 
Portugal (hereafter designated by its local denomination “SCUTS”): an example where 
the public sector was facing the majority of risks. According to this dissertation’s 
calculations based on the 2013 State’s budget, gross future payments to road sector 
PPPs represent 11.3% of the size of the Portuguese economy. The fact that the country 
has entered in numerous contracts without performing any risk assessment led to this 
burden on the public debt.  
 
Since 2003, a discount rate of 6.08% based on the 10-year Treasury bonds at that 
time has been ever since used by the public sector to discount these future impacts. 
Using this rate so extensively means that this rate represented the country’s default risk 
throughout the last 11 years, regardless of any change in economic and financial 
environment faced by the country and its government. There is some discussion about 
the fact that nothing was done to update or change the 6.08% official (even legal) 
discount rate during the recent financial crisis. In that period, interest rates associated 
with Portuguese bonds on the secondary market went up, with the added perceived 
default risk of the country. We suggest that the Government should have renegotiated 
with the private sector, offering a higher discount rate. This would have deleveraged the 
concessionaires from commercial banks and investors, as well as would have benefited 
the economy and would have reduced future burden of the government. Instead of this 
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fixed rate, it would be expected that this discount rate followed the path of the yield 
curve. This dissertation proposes an update for the discount rate. When discounting PPP 
payments, a long-term government bond adjusted for market risk should be used while 
in a public sector procurement it is suggested the use of the risk-free rate only. 
 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we gather literature to provide a 
brief definition of PPPs and their main advantages and disadvantages. This is followed 
by the literature on the concept of risk allocation and Value for Money (VfM) as well as 
a deep background on discount rates in PPPs and, the methods used by several 
governments to calculate them. In section 3, the methodology used to calculate the 
discount rates is presented. Section 4 outlines the PPP’s context in Portugal, 
particularly, the sectors where they are implemented; their evolution since their first 
implementation and criticisms about future payments. Results and a discount rate 





















2. Literature Review 
 
 
2.1. Brief Concept of PPP 
 
One important driver of one country’s economy is its infrastructures and the 
quality of service they provide. In most countries, there is a deficit of public service in 
what comes to infrastructures due to the difficulty of funding. Therefore, one problem 
that has arisen is known as the “infrastructure gap” characterized by the difference 
between the population needs and the resources governments have historically invested 
in meeting those needs (Deloitte Research Study-Closing the Infrastructure Gap, 2006). 
 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are seen as one of the solutions for this issue. 
PPPs can be defined as “an agreement between the government and one or more private 
partners (which may include the operators and the financers) according to which the 
private partners deliver the service in such a manner that the service delivery objectives 
of the government are aligned with the profit objectives of the private partners and 
where the effectiveness of the alignment depends on a sufficient transfer of risk to the 
private partners. “(OECD, 2008) This said, it differs from a traditional public provision 
in the sense that the government signs a long-term contract with the private sector to 
supply a service to the public sector that the private consortium designs, builds, owns 
and runs the physical assets required for the delivery of the service and not by the 
government building or purchasing physical assets, retaining ownership and using 
public sector employees or a private contractor to deliver the required service (Grout, 
2003). A key element is the bundling of the construction and operation of the asset. The 
private partner will receive either a stream of payments from the government, user 
charges imposed directly on the end users or even a combination of both (OECD 32
nd
 
annual meeting, 2011). 
 
PPPs can be placed between traditional public procurement and fully private 
provision. Often the government sets the quality and quantity required, and allows the 
private sector to design and build the infrastructure. By doing this, the public entity is 
dealing with the risk of having a “faulty design” as well as improving the efficiency of 
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the service. In contrast to a traditional procurement, where the government buys the 
capital asset directly from the private party, here, it buys the stream of payments that are 
generated with the asset. This means that the operation & maintenance (O&M) of the 
capital asset as well as the delivery of the service are total responsibility of the private 
sector. However, not all the risks are allocated to the private party, usually, the risk is 
allocated to the party that can manage it better.  
In PPPs, all the costs during the investment stage are assumed by the private 
sector which enables the government to avoid the investment’s impacts on the budget 
and national debt. This is considered one of the main advantages of PPPs. During the 
investment stage there are no cash outflows and payments are made to the private party 
during the operational stage only, covering O&M, debt service and corporate taxes. In 
addition, they provide shareholders a return (Sarmento and Renneboog, 2014). 
The concession contract between the public and private sector combines 
construction, financing and operation and is limited in time. Despite not having all the 
conditions covered in the contract, the contract is complex and covers a wide range of 
issues such as conditions of design, construction, financing, O&M, public and users’ 
payments, and also the residual value or the final transfer of the asset from the private to 
the public sector. Moreover, a series of detailed contracts with third parties are 
comprised in the PPP: a construction contract with the construction company, a 
financing contract with the syndicated banks, outsourcing contracts for O&M, insurance 
contracts to cover risks and a shareholder’s agreement that defines the long-term 
relations with the PPP owners. Although the public sector is not formally present in 
these contracts, it is still crucial for the success of the infrastructure that the government 
monitors the process (Hart, 2003; Sarmento and Renneboog, 2014). 
According to Moralos and Amekudzi (2008) there are several phases in a PPP 
procurement process: 1) an initial feasibility assessment determining if the project is 
economically viable and whether it should be pursued as a PPP; 2) the bidding process; 
3) the construction phase; 4) the operation phase.  
 
This type of agreement is based on the creation, by the private sector, of a single 







Source: Grimsey & Lewis (2002) 
 
 
A consortium is necessary since there is no company that has the in-house know-
how necessary to fund, design, build and operate the service (Carrillo et al., 2006). This 
private entity is financed through a method of raising long-term debt for major projects 
called Project Finance (Yescombe, 2007). 
The Special Purpose Vehicle gets its larger portion of the financing through 
banks (lenders) where it gets around 70%-90% of debt and the rest is provided by 
shareholders’ equity. The simple objective of this private company is the generation of 
cash-flows for the project and for the investors (Ye, 2009).  These future cash-flows are 
the only guarantee of the financing by the banks, thus, the risk that is allocated to the 
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Figure 1-Concession contract between public and private sectors and third parties. 
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2.2. Advantages and Disadvantages 
 
In the literature, we can find seven main advantages and seven main 
disadvantages, regarding PPPs. The advantages are: 1) the “off-balance sheet”; 2) the 
possibility of building an infrastructure; 3) Value for Money (VfM); 4) Joining 
competences; 5) Risk Allocation; 6) Single contract; 7) Focus more on Strategy than on 
Operational tasks. However, these advantages have their drawbacks and may be 
considered as disadvantages. Having said this, the disadvantages are: 1) the “off-balance 
sheet”; 2) the possibility of building an infrastructure; 3) Value for Money (VfM); 4) 
Risk Allocation; 5) Single contract; 6) Focus more on Strategy than on Operational 
tasks ; 7) the private cost of financing. 
 
To begin with, the advantage that is mostly described in the literature (Grimsey 
& Lewis, 2005; Sarmento and Renneboog, 2014; Yescombe, 2007) is the “off-balance 
sheet” accounting of this transaction, also called as the “budgetary benefit”. Public 
expenditure is not affected by PPPs, thus, there is no impact on the public debt during 
the investment stage. This concept is briefly explained in (Yescombe, 2007): “A PPP 
allows the capital cost of a public sector facility to be spread out over its life, rather 
than requiring it to be charged immediately against the public budget. This cost is then 
either paid by users instead of paying taxes or, charged to the public sector budget over 
the life of the PPP contract, in either case through payment of service fees.” However, 
future payments from the public party to the private consortium will be accounted for in 
the government’s budget.  On the other hand, one of the major concerns regarding PPPs 
refers to this concept of “budgetary benefit”. This temptation to avoid budget 
constraints may lead to a debt overhang (the debt level is so high that the government 
cannot ask for more debt) (Sarmento and Renneboog, 2014).  
Secondly, according to Grout (2005) this type of contract makes it possible to 
build an infrastructure that otherwise would not be built due to budget restrictions as 
well as helps to reduce the infrastructure gap problem. Nevertheless, it can also be seen 
as a disadvantage because as there is no budget restriction, governments are less likely 
to be careful in their choice of projects (Heald and Georgiou, 2011) 
 
Another advantage is the Value for Money (see next section) which brings the 
idea that the same quantity and quality can be provided at a lower overall cost. 
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However, Value for Money is complex to measure and has led to an exhaustive debate 
on whether PPPs actually achieve it (Grimsey, 2007; Moralos and Amekudzi, 2008).  
 
It is also worth mentioning that PPP projects bring private competences to the 
public project. By doing this, the public sector is certain that the private sector will 
bring more efficiency to it. The expertise and experience of the private sector 
encourages innovation which results not only in reduced costs, shorter delivery times, 
and improvement in the functional design, construction processes but also better facility 
management and operational processes. By using its innovative skills, the private 
partner can manage complex financial arrangement more efficiently, whereas the public 
sector is able to control policies and regulations. As a result, the combination of both 
provides a higher value for the project (Harris, 2004). 
 
Fifth, sharing all the risks throughout the life of the contract is another advantage 
of PPPs but one difference from the public provision where the government bears all the 
risks. Risk allocation assumes that risk should be transferred to the party that manages it 
better leading to reduced cost associated with risk (Deloitte Research Study-Closing the 
Infrastructure Gap, 2006). On the other hand, the valuation of risk transfer is not that 
straightforward and leads to some subjectivity (Shaoul, 2005). The lack of experience 
showed by the public sector aggravates this situation (Ball et al., 2007; Pollit, 2002). 
 
Sixth, a PPP is seen as a single contract between the public and one private 
company therefore it represents simplicity, whereas, on the other hand, traditional 
procurement consists on multiple contracts. Nonetheless, this contract is still incomplete 
which often leads to future renegotiations (Engel et al., 2006). In addition, there is 
asymmetry of information between the private and public sector as a single contract 
allows the private sector to have more information. Moreover, it may lead to an 
‘opportunistic behavior’ on the part of the private party (Guasch, 2003; Chong et al., 
2006b) which happens when a contracting party strategically uses the contract’s 
imperfections to gain a higher proportion of the value generated by the contract at the 




Furthermore, (Bovaird, 2004) states that the public sector can focus more on 
strategy and less on operational tasks when it initiates a PPP. Yet, as PPP contracts are 
long-term (usually 30 years) and government policies change over time, strategic 
planning becomes unpredictable (Heald, 2003; Sarmento and Renneboog, 2014). 
 
The last drawback is that the private consortium has a higher cost of financing 
than the public because lenders to the government are not taking any significant risk, 
whereas lending money to a PPP project is certainly riskier (Yescombe, 2007, p.18). 
However, this is not unanimous among the literature and has created a huge debate that 
will be explained later in the discount rate section. 
 
 
2.3. Value for Money and Risk Allocation 
 
 
According to the National Audit Office, value for money (VfM) is defined as 
“the optimum combination of whole life cost and quality (or fitness for purpose) to meet 
the user’s requirement.”
2
 The OECD 32
nd
 annual meeting (2011) claims that “a key 
argument for PPPs is that through harnessing the private sector’s expertise in 
combining the design and operation of an asset – applying a whole of life view – the 
service can be provided in a more efficient manner, i.e. providing more “value for 
money” compared to traditional forms of procurement and production.” (See 
Appendix- Exhibit I) 
To achieve VfM, there has to be a proper allocation of the risks between the 
public sector and the private sector because, on one side transferring too little risks to 
the private sector would make the project inefficient. On the other hand, if the private 
sector bears more risks than it can handle it would result in a high-risk project, and 
larger payments would make it too costly to pursue as a PPP. If this happens, VfM 
would not be achieved (Moralos and Amekudzi, 2008). However, achieving this can 
become a very hard job, as Grimsey and Lewis (2002) refer the emphasis on risk 
transfer can be misrepresentative as value for money requires fair allocation of risk 
between the public and private sector partners, and there may be a natural struggle 
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between the public sector’s need to demonstrate the value for money versus the private 
sector’s need for robust revenue streams to support the financing arrangements.  
There are many reasons why governments undertake PPPs but achieving VfM is 
the main reason why a PPP project should be carried out (Grimsey and Lewis 2005, 
p.346). The authors also support that the core test to estimate value for money is the 
Public sector comparator (PSC). This model is “based on estimates of full costs, 
revenues and risks, set out in cash flow terms, discounted at a public sector rate to an 
NPV.” It is then compared with the discounted value of payments, incorporating risks 
and costs retained, under the PSC model. Fundamentally, what should be tested is 
whether a PPP achieves a lower overall NPV of costs than if carried out entirely by the 
public sector. Certainly, the discount rate has a great impact on the project’s VfM hence 
the conclusion of whether to pursue a PPP or not. (Moralos and Amedzuki, 2008) 
 
 
2.4. Discount Rate 
 
 
Following the reasoning above, the discount rate plays a major role on 
discounting the cost cash flows of public provision and PPP projects. Hirshleifer (1964, 
1966) and Sandmo and Drèze (1971) claim that when assessing a VfM test it should be 
used one single rate for both procurement methods (PSC and PPP). Arrow and Lind 
(1990) argued that this rate should be the risk-free rate. As it is going to be discussed 
later, many governments follow the policy of using the same rate for evaluating public 
and private projects. On the other hand, Grout (2003) argues the opposite: “when using 
one single rate, the VfM test is biased.” Hence, the discussion of whether to use a 
higher discount rate to assess a public provision when compared to a PPP is of a high 
concern (Grout, 2003). The main reason given by the literature is that the government 
can pool risks. The public sector can borrow at lower rates than the private sector which 
comes from the fact that they have a lower probability of bankruptcy (Arrow and Lind, 
1970; Samuelson, 1964). However, several authors
3
 claim that this argument is 
fallacious because it relates to the default rate and not to the differences in risk between 
public and private projects.  
                                                          
3
 See for example Bailey and Jensen (1972) and Grout (2003) 
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According to Grout (2003), failure to recognize that the discount rates must be 
different may lead to high reliance on public procurement and prejudice the private 
sector. Continuing his explanation, to value a public sector provision a discount rate is 
needed to discount the cost cash flows which represent the cost that the government has 
to build the infrastructure. Oppositely, this cost cash flow is a revenue stream to the 
private entity and needs to be valued from the revenue side. Grout (2003) continues his 
reasoning claiming that “with a PPP, this revenue stream is not the equivalent cost of 
building the facility. It is the cash flow associated with the flow of benefits valued at the 
price in the contract.” The problem is that the cash flows that are discounted by the 
public sector tend to be cost cash flows whereas any private contribution to the 
provision of services, when viewed by the government, tends to have some elements of 
revenue or net revenues built in. In addition, there is every reason to suppose that the 
risk characteristics are different. The author concludes that, even in a world of imperfect 
markets it is still reasonable to use a lower discount rate on the public sector. As a result 
of this argument, it is inappropriate to use the same discount rate in a VfM analysis 
because it prejudices the private sector supply and leads to extensive reliance on public 
procurement. 
 
Despite this, there is still a strong debate regarding this subject. Also, there is no 
agreement on the approach used to calculate the governments’ discount rate (Shugart, 
2008). 
For the VfM test, the key question is whether the discount rate should be based 
on a social discount rate (SDR) or rates coming from the financial markets (FMR). 
 If one uses a SDR, the problem lies on how to estimate it, while if using a FMR, the 
question that should be addressed is whether to use a “risk-free” rate or the yield on the 
corporation’s debt or even both (Contreras, No date). The SDR can be seen as a 
measure of the importance of the welfare of future generations in comparison with the 
welfare of present generations. This shows the importance of the discount rate 
estimation as it can alter the utility for future populations. As Contreras (No date) 
clarifies, using a high discount rate shows that society does not want to invest a great 
amount of capital in projects that may improve the life quality of future generations. 
Some welfare economists use market interest rates on their NPV assessments. But, there 
are arguments that have been used against the use of market rates as social discount 
rates, such as market imperfections and taxes (Drèze and Stern, 1990). For these 
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authors, since market rates only incorporate current utility preferences, governments 
should go far beyond market interest rates. 
 
When it comes to SDR, there are two alternatives: the Social Time Preference 
rate (STPR) and the Social Opportunity Cost of Capital (SOCC). The first rate reflects 
the rate at which society is willing to pay for receiving something now rather than in the 
future, while the other is the marginal cost of capital used in a public project. These two 
approaches are the ones which are more often referred in the literature (Harberger, 
1972; Lind, 1982; Roumboutsos, 2010).  
Young (2002) explains that first, it is important to understand why the approach 
to the discount rate is not so simple. Imagine, for instance, a perfect capital market 
where there is only one market interest rate, the same information for all investors and 
there are no aspects that are not covered by the market. Following these assumptions, 
the market clears at a rate where the time preference for consumption equals the 
opportunity cost of capital. However, due to market imperfections these two rates 
cannot be equal leading to the inevitable question of which rate to use.  
In order to understand the difficulty in selecting the “correct” method the 
following example will explain it clearly.  
Considering the example of (Roumboutsos, 2010) that people save more money 
when the return is higher, line SS illustrates the capital offered for investment, this is, 
the preference between current and future consumption. Line II illustrates the demand 
for investment capital as a function of the cost of capital. When there are no distortions, 
the market will balance for a rate (r), for which,          . On the other hand, 
distortions will point to different rates, leading to the uncertainty of the most 
appropriate method to use (see Appendix- Exhibit II). 
The difference between these two approaches lies on how they transfer resources 
between people living at different points in time. Contreras (No date) argues that the 
method of choice consists of classifying the resources according to whether they come 
from consumption or investment. In case they come from investment, this component 
should be converted into consumption-equivalent units by using the shadow price of 





In his working paper, (Evans, 2006) emphasizes that different approaches to 
calculate the public sector discount rate lead to different discount rates across European 
countries. In 2002, the French government used a rate of 8%
4
 solely based on the 
marginal product of capital (SOCC) whereas Germany based its rate on recent values of 
the real long-term government bond rate which was 3%
5
. Subsequently, while it may be 
debated that the STPR is theoretically superior to the long-term government bond rate 
as a choice of social discount rate (HM Treasury, 1997 p.83-84; Spackman, 2004 p.488-
489) the struggle to obtaining reliable parameter estimates makes the market bond rate a 
possible choice on realistic grounds. This line of argument can be used by those who 
agree with current German and Portuguese practice.  
One appealing feature of social discounting based on the long-term government 
bond rate is that for the Eurozone countries the same bond rate applies. Additionally, 
with these countries observing a common low inflation target, the ex-ante real bond 
rates should be much the same. Moreover, when discounting benefits and costs, it has 
been debated whether the Portuguese public sector should use the long-term Portuguese 
bond rate or the German one since these two countries share the same currency. Since 
2003, the Portuguese government has been using a discount rate (after allowing for 
inflation) based on the 10-year government bond rate of 6.08%
6
 for discounting the 
future payments regarding PPPs. The problem is that, at that time it may have been a 
correct rate however accordingly to the rating of the country and the volatility of the 
market since then, there should have existed an update for it. This paper will address 
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 Set in 1985 at 8% real based on Commissariat Général à la stratégie et à la prospective Dec 2003 
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2.5. Discount Rates covered in the literature 
2.5.1. Social Time Preference Rate (STPR) 
 
Most likely, one of the main exponents in this rate, Feldstein (1964) states that the 
social discount rate “must reflect public policy and social ethics, as well as judgment 
about future economic conditions” and his view “would be to allow administrative 
determination of the STPR with whatever weight to the welfare of future generations 
these democratic administrators would allow.”  
 
According to Grimsey and Lewis (2005), the discount rate used to discount the 
stream of benefits and costs should be based on the “Social Time Preference Rate” 
which has two components:  
 
1. The basic “Social Time Preference Rate” (STPR). This represents the rate at which 
society is willing to pay for receiving something now rather than in the future. 
Calculations
7
 suggest that in most developed economies this is around 3.5%–4.0% 
in real terms (i.e. before allowing for price inflation). 
2.  Some allowance for other factors, mostly to ensure that the public entity does not 
assess the benefit of projects without taking into account the risk to which it exposes 
taxpayers along the process (for example, the potential to incur additional costs if 
things follow the wrong way).  
The Conference on “Discount Rates for the Evaluation of Public Private 
Partnerships” defines “Social Time Preference” as the time preference of population, as 
a whole, for marginal income or consumption.  
Ramsey (1928) set out the famous equation: 
 
             
Where   = pure time preference, per cent per year; 
            = income elasticity of the marginal utility of income (with sign reversed); 
           = rate of growth of per capita real consumption (income), per cent per year. 
 
                                                          
7
 HM Treasury (2003) 
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Similarly, HM Treasury (2003) uses a STPR but then, has some variations from 
Grimsey and Lewis (2005). This STPR is the sum of three components: 1) “pure time 
preference” rate; 2) a “catastrophe risk” rate; 3) and a third component that takes into 
account the idea that as per capita income increases, people will care less about 
additional income, and this increases their preference for money today relative to money 
in the future. 
They calculate the “pure time preference” rate plus the “catastrophe risk” rate to 
be 1.5% and the third component at 2%, meaning that the STPR is 3.5%, which is the 
real discount rate used to compare the PSC with the PPP project.  
An issue arises when considering projects with very long-term effects, the so-
called intergenerational impacts, because these projects have impact on future 
generations. The STPR is a reflection of subjective time preferences and one expects 
that different individuals have different time preferences as well as it differs across 
different time horizons (Contreras, No date). As Grimsey and Lewis (2002) claimed, the 
issue is uncertainty. Weitzman (1998), Sozou (1998) and Azfar (1999) showed how the 
uncertainty problem regarding the interest rate could be addressed by time-declining 
discount rates (DDRs). Weitzman (1998) argues in favor of “a social rate of return that 
is not only lower than the private rate of return, but that is expected to decline 
systematically over time”.  
Uncertainty about the future can be dependent on many factors, such as: the rate of 
economic growth, the amount of capital that will be accumulated, the degree of 
marginal utility of income of distant generations, and/or the state of the environment, 
among others (OXERA, 2002; Contreras, No date; Spackman, 2004). Moreover, there is 




  When considering long-term projects, with a maturity of more than 30 years, UK 
proposes a declining discount rate. Before 2003, U.K. used a discount rate of 6% based 
on a weighted average between STPR and the SOCC (Evans, 2006). It may seem 
intuitive to use a risk-free discount rate, even if just because it is certainly difficult to 
predict these three components of the STPR and, as far as Heald (2003) is concern, 
there are far more implications to PPPs than a simple reduction in the discount rate from 
6% to 3.5%. 
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 More recently, Evans and Sezer (2004) and Evans (2006) have argued for a standard 
benchmark European discount rate of around 3% to 4% based on the SRTP. This rate is 
slightly lower than the 5% rate recommended by the European Commission (2002) and, 
as such, its use should result in a more generous distribution of budget funds to longer-
term projects. Likewise, Lopez (2008) calculated SDRs for nine Latin American 
countries
9
 based on the SRTP. He stressed the fact that, depending on the growth 
opportunities of the country, these DRs can vary from about 3% to 4% in a future low 
growth scenario and to 5% to 7% in a high growth scenario. 
Despite all of this, some authors believe that the opportunity cost of capital should 




2.5.2. Social Opportunity Cost of Capital (SOCC) 
 
The financial economics literature takes the view that the social discount rate 
should measure the social opportunity cost of capital, which depends on the level of 
systematic risk of each project. Basically, this rate is the pre-tax rate of return yielded 
on private investment with similar risk profile as the public sector. The “Social 
opportunity cost” discount rate is measured by the commercial rate of return that would 
be yielded on private investment. This rate reduces the net present value of the best 
alternative private use of funds to zero meaning that it mainly reflects in financial 
market terms. Basically, the government should take into account what “similar” 
projects would provide in returns if undertaken by the private sector. 
If the public party uses this discount rate and only invests in positive NPV 
projects, then public projects would not displace higher value private sector projects 
(Young, 2002). 
Young (2002) argues that this approach is the most suitable if the government is 
thinking about investments that could also be undertaken by the private party, for 
instance, if the public sector “is investing in state owned enterprises and service 
delivery crown entities.” Moreover, the SOCC rate is also the most appropriate method 
                                                          
9
 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico, and Peru 
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to use when undertaking cost recovery of an already existing activity because it is 
concerned with the investment decision being made rather than the service being 
provided. 
According to Young (2002), there are mainly three methods to calculate the 
SOCC rate: 1) CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model); 2) APT (Arbitrage Pricing 
Theory); 3) Fama-French’s multi-factor model. The use of CAPM model reflects an 
opportunity cost of capital approach, which is used by Canada and New Zealand.
10
 
Moreover, this method is used to calculate the expected return on equity for the public 
sector and should be then used in a weighted average cost of capital (WACC) formula 
to take into account the assumed debt and equity structure in the public sector. 
  Lally (2000, p.47) argues “However, parameter estimation problems appear to 
be considerably less for the CAPM than for the APT, multi-factor models (such as 
Fama-French) and the dividend growth model. These considerations do not favor any 
alternative to the CAPM, and this is consistent with the CAPM’s dominance in 
practice.” 
 According to the New Zealand Treasury (2008), the usual approach is to 
estimate the return from alternative investments in the private sector which is a good 
proxy for the Crown’s cost of capital. This cost of capital, as it was previously 
mentioned, is the return foregone by investing on one private project rather than in an 
alternative one in the public sector. One alternative outside the public sector, as the New 
Zealand Treasury explains, can be the financial market because the companies who 
make up this market are companies who search for the best investments in the economy 
and, in fact, the government does invest in the financial market. However, there are 
critics to this discount rate stating that financial markets are not perfect due to 
externalities and taxation. But, these two externalities can be taken into account. 
Externalities can be taken into account explicitly in the individual cash flows. Taxation 
reduces the amount of capital to be invested compared to a situation with zero tax. They 
explain that, using a pre-tax rate of return is equivalent to tax public investments. As a 
consequence, these market imperfections are insufficient to change the discount rate. 
When it comes to Netherlands, the Ministry of Finance supports that the 
discount rate should be very close to the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) for 
both the PPP and the PSC (PPP Knowledge Centre, 2002a and 2002b). When 
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 Treasury Government issues “Cost Benefit Analysis Primer” (Jul 2008) 
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comparing public investment with subsequent benefits in kind, the US OMB
11 
uses a 
SOCC rate of 7%. 
 
 
2.5.3. Weighted average between STPR and SOCC 
 
It is often discussed that a private commercial (SOCC) rate of return should be 
used for government discounting or even a weighted-average of this rate with the STPR 
(Spackman, 2004; Spackman, 2008). According to Spackman (2004), it is proposed a 
weighted average of the two approaches described above, i.e.,                    
where   is the share of resources or cost displacing private investment and (1 a) equals 
the proportion of resources or costs displacing current consumption.  As previously 
mentioned, the U.K. treasury used a discount rate of 6% before 2003, based on this 
approach. 
 
2.5.4. Long-term government borrowing rate 
 
As Contreras (no date) defends, the VfM test does not evaluate market failures 
and consequently, market information should be used instead of the social discount 
rates. 
In some countries, the long-term borrowing rate is seen as a proxy for the 
discount rate on the grounds that the government uses additional borrowing to fund 
incremental expenditure. The use of the government borrowing rate as the discount rate 
is mainly used by the US (Spackman, 2004). When it comes to AAA rating economies, 
this rate tends to be approximated to the STPR and below a risk-adjusted discount rate. 
 
There are basically two approaches to adjusting for risk (Contreras, no date). 
One approach for calculating the discount rate is to use a public sector’s “risk-free” and 
add a risk margin to reflect project risk. An alternative method is to value risk in the 






cash flows so that a risk free discount rate is applied to cash flows that have been 
adjusted for risk. Essentially, in terms of the conventional discounting formula, in the 
first approach risk is allowed for in the denominator, whereas in the other treatment a 
risk adjustment is made in the numerator.  
Despite having some equivalence between the two methods, it is easy to understand 
how the process of putting theory into practice could result in different outputs. If the 
risk-adjusted interest rate is used, then it must reflect systematic risk rather than 
idiosyncratic project risk, since the latter can be diversified in a way that no individual 
bears substantial risk (Brealey and Myers, 2003; Grimsey and Lewis, 2005). According 
to Heald (2003), the idea of using a “risk-free” discount rate has an intuitive appeal, 
since adjusting the cash-flows for risk seems particularly difficult to carry through. The 
issue is not risk, but uncertainty according to Grimsey and Lewis (2002).  
Moreover, Contreras (no date) explains that governments traditionally do not 
plan for systematic risks or uncertainty, and as a result, in the case of public sector 
procurement, the calculations only contain quantifications for project-specific risk. The 
public sector can be able to ignore uncertainty across its whole portfolio, while bidders 
for a PPP project cannot.  
 
  In Australia, more specifically in the city of Victoria (Shugart, 2008; 
Partnerships Victoria, 2001), it was followed the same approach as in U.K. but it was 
also revised in 2003. Although, they suggested a different route on the reasoning that 
the discount rate methodology used to calculate the PSC should be consistent with the 
one that the government uses to assess bids. This is recommended to be a rate indicative 
of the project risk, such that the discount rate is a function of the projects’ risks and as 
follows, needs to be specific to each project. In perfect capital markets, this would mean 
that, as long as there is sufficient competition to drive every component of the deal to 
maximum efficiency, the proper discount rate would be the rate of return implicit in the 
winning bid, concluding that would not be necessary to calculate a specific discount rate 
for analysis (Grimsey and Lewis: Discount Debates, 2004; Grimsey and Lewis, 2005). 
(Shugart, 2008) goes further on Partnerships Victoria. They start with a risk-free rate 
and then adjust it for risk by using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The risk-
free rate used corresponds to the yield to maturity (ytm) of a 10-year Commonwealth 
Bond and back in 2003 was 3%. More recently, this value has risen to about 3.5%. The 
market risk premium is taken to be 6%. The risk adjustment based on CAPM takes into 
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account three “risk bands” according to type of project, with asset betas of 0.3, 0.5, and 
0.9 yielding risk premiums of 1.8%, 3% and 5.4%. Water, transport and energy projects 
are considered to be at the medium “risk band”. Following this, their discount rate 
should be 6.5% (=3.5%+0.5 x 6%). 
This rate above is going to be used for net cash flows of the underlying project 
before financing. Partnerships Victoria sees two further considerations in determining 
the rates to be used for the PSC-PPP comparison: 
1. It is costs that are being considered (negative cash flows). 
2. Risks should be seen from the perspective of the public sector. For the PPP 
project, these are not the underlying risks of the project but the risks that are 
intentionally or unintentionally borne by the public sector – mostly through the 
payments that the government makes to the private consortium.  
 
Partnerships Victoria state that the PSC cost flows should always be discounted 
using the risk-free rate whereas the PPP outflows (seen from the public sector 
perspective) should be discounted using the risk-free rate plus a risk premium that is 
proportional to the systematic risk that has been transferred to the private sector. They 
make it clear that these discount rates are meaningful only when comparing the two 
projects: “…using the risk-free rate for the PSC will not necessarily give the present 
value of the true costs to the government of that option. It is not the right rate to use in a 
stand-alone analysis of the PSC project.” 
 
Since 2006, Australia’s Commonwealth Finance Ministry has established several 





According to Central PPP Policy Unit (2006), the discount rate used when 
comparing a PPP project with the PSC in Ireland “should reflect the relative value of 
the cash flows from the State Authority’s perspective.” For them “the discount rate is 
based on the risk-free cost of debt to the public sector – the yield on the appropriate 
long term Government Bond.” Central Guidance in Ireland states that this rate should be 
used in discounting all cash flows and if any adjustment for risk is to be made, it should 
be made to the cash flows and not to the discount rate. This same approach is used by 
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 Commonwealth Finance Ministry Handbook of Cost-Benefit Analysis, Jan 2006 
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South Africa’s Government in which they propose that one should begin by using the 
yield of a government bond (risk-free rate) with a remaining maturity similar to the 
duration of the project. In addition, they take the same opinion as Ireland in the sense 
that risk should be accounted for in the cash flows and not in the discount rate. 
However, when “it is not possible to accurately reflect the effect of all risks in the cash 
flows of the project a risk premium could be added”. It should also be emphasized that 
this rate must be used for both the PSC and the PPP model, thus, South Africa’s 





2.6. Main Findings in the Literature  
This table summarizes all the diversity in the discount rate used to discount public benefits and costs, referred in the literature review. 
Table 1- Government discount rates in eleven different countries (2014) 
Country Central Guidance Discount Rate 
Australia 
Commomwealth Finance 
Ministry issues “Handbook of 
CBA, Jan 2006” 
In 2001, Partnerships Victoria used a rate of 6,5% for water, transport and energy projects (PPP 
projects), based on a risk-free rate which was adjusted for risk using CAPM values. For the PSC-
PPP comparison, they used the risk-free rate for the PSC cost flows. 
In 2006, SOCC rate for CBA analysis was settled at 10% and STPR of 3% (if only consumption is 
taken into account but rarely used).   
Canada 
Treasury Board Secretariat 
issues “Benefit Cost Analysis 
Guide: 2007” 
8% real rate based on SOCC. 
France 
Commissariat Général à la 
stratégie et à la prospective 
issued  a report : « Cost 
Benefit Assessment  of Public 
Investments : Dec 2003 » 
4,5% based on CAPM, propose a risk-free rate declining to 1,5% after 2070 and a risk premium of 
2% increasing to 3% after 2070. 




Guidelines for the Provision 
of Infrastructures and Capital 
Investments through PPPs: 
Procedures for the 
Assessment, Approval, Audit 
and Procurement of Projects-
July 2006  
Based on the risk-free cost of debt to the public sector. 
Netherlands 
PPP Knowledge Centre 
(2002a and 2002b) 
Discount rate based on private’s sector weighted average cost of capital. 
New Zealand 
New Zealand Treasury: New 
Zealand Primer (2008) 
Currently, this discount rate is also based on the SOCC method. There are four different rates of 6%, 
8%, 8% and 9.5% for different projects (buildings, default, infrastructure and technology). 
Portugal 
Based on “Despacho n.º 13 
208/2003 (2.ª série).” 
Since 2003, discount rate is based on 10 year government bond adjusted for inflation (6.08%) 
U.K. HM Treasury (2003) 
Before 2003, Treasury used a weighted average between STPR and SOCC. Currently, a rate of 3.5% 
is used, based on STPR. Declining discount rates after 30 years. 
US 
Office of Management and 
Budget: Circular N.º A-94 
Revised (Appendix C on 
Cost-effectiveness revised Jan 
2006) 
7% based on SOCC. This rate is used to compare public investment with subsequent benefits. For 
cost-effectiveness analysis, lease-purchase analysis, internal government investment and asset sales 




Yield of a government bond with a remaining maturity similar to the duration of the project. 
Treasury does not prescribe a rate to use for the discount rate. 
 
 
It is evident that there is no universal method when calculating the discount rate for the 
public sector, as every country, based on different assumptions, has its own policy and 
discount rate approach.  
The Portuguese Government has first given use to PPPs in 1993 with the 
construction of the Vasco da Gama Bridge, investing an amount of 867 million euros 
(€), and by now has already created 36 public-private partnerships.  
Based on the different methodologies used by other countries, such as those 
referred in the literature, several discount rates will be calculated and for each 
established discount rate the NPV of these PPP contracts will be analyzed between the 
year 2005 and 2013 as well as a comparison with and the NPV using the current 
Portuguese discount rate. This assessment, not only will be made from year to year 
(horizontal basis) but also from discount rate to discount rate (vertical basis).  
Certainly, different methodologies have different assumptions therefore the 
output shows different discount rates. Furthermore, this paper will show the main 
concerns that are linked to the current practice of the Portuguese government. What we 
propose next is to consider a methodology or the inputs that seem fair in order to 


















3. Methodology and data 
 
 
As mentioned before, one of the purposes of this paper is to compare and analyze 
the NPV of the Portuguese Government net payments, between 2005 and 2013, 
regarding the 36 PPP contracts operating in Portugal, using the most known methods 
referred in the literature, with the NPV using the current discount rate practice of the 
Portuguese public sector. The methods which were previously discussed are: 1) Social 
Time Preference Rate; 2) Social Opportunity Cost of Capital; 3) Weighted average of 
the previous two; 4) Long-term government borrowing rate. 
In this section, the calculations behind each approach, that will then define the 
discount rate to discount the PPP payments, will be explained in detail  
The data used was based on estimated future payments to the PPPs that were taken 
from the State budget reports from 2005 until 2013. Other relevant data was used but it 




3.1. Social Time Preference Rate (STPR) 
 
 
The methodology followed in this subsection was based on Evans & Sezer (2004) 
study where the authors calculate social discount rates (SDR’s) for six major economies 
using the Ramsey formula. Additionally, the UK Treasury’s guidance on appraisal and 
evaluation in Central Government (HM Treasury, 2003) currently uses this method 
since 2003. This model has its origin in models of individual savings behavior, in which 
individuals maximize utility (welfare) over time (OXERA, 2002). 








Based on the Ramsey formula (Ramsey, 1928), the Social Time Preference Rate 
can be calculated as follows:  
 
Equation 1: Social Time Preference Rate 
        𝒈   
 
Where,  
p=pure time discount rate 
e= absolute value of the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption (income) 
g=projected long-run growth of per capita real consumption (income) 
 
In order to reach the STPR, each one of these three components needs to be calculated. 
 
3.1.1.  Rate of time preference,”p” 
 
Pearce and Ulph (1999) have further decomposed this parameter into: 
 
 
Equation 2: Rate of time preference 
        
 
 Where d is the rate at which society is discounted independently of any risks to life, 
known as the rate of pure time preference; and L is the rate of chances in life chances. 
This pure time discount rate (p) can be seen as the rate at which individuals discount 
future utility (Evans, 2006). 
The first parameter reflects individuals’ preference for consumption now, rather 
than at a later period, with an unchanging level of consumption per capita over time. 
Several economists agree to give d a value of zero, however this would imply that 
current generations should reduce their levels of consumption drastically, and in some 
cases, to subsistence levels (Contreras, no date). Literature agrees on a range between 
0% - 0.5% for this component of the STPR, thus, a value of 0.25% seems reasonable to 
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use. There is no easy way to know whether d is going up or down across time (OXERA, 
2002).  
 
The rate of chances in life chances, also referred as “catastrophe risk”, shows the 
likelihood that there will be some event so tragic that all returns from projects are 
eliminated, or at least unpredictably altered. Pearce and Ulph (1999) stress out that the 
correct understanding of L is related to whole generations, more specifically, the 
probability of survival to the next period. 
When we have an inter-temporal utility function specified over a period of time, 
it is rational to expect that individuals discount their future utilities on the basis of their 
survival probability over that time period. Basically, each individual would discount its 
future utility by the probability of not being alive at that date (Kula, 2004). Catastrophe 
risk (L) can then be calculated as the average death risk of one individual of the 
Portuguese population in each one of the years 2005 to 2013. Therefore, in order to 
determine L, data concerning the number of Portuguese population and the number of 
deaths were used, between 1970 and 2013, taken out from the OECD website.  
 
 
Finally, the pure time discount rate was calculated from 2005 to 2013 by the formula: 
 
Equation 3: Pure time preference rate 
   
 
               
 ∑
       
           
 












3.1.2. The growth of per capita real consumption, 𝒈 
 
 
Observations of very long-term runs of per-capita consumption data give better 
estimation results because it helps reducing problems of using shorter runs of past data 
(Pearce and Ulph, 1999; OXERA, 2002). Consequently, when estimating g, data 
concerning private consumption was also taken between 1970 and 2013 from OECD 
website. Then, to get the average growth of per capita real consumption, consumption 
per capita was computed for these years simply by using:  
 
Equation 4: Consumption per capita at year t 
 
                    
           
 
 
When calculating the average growth of consumption per capita between 2005 
and 2013, the next formula was followed:  
 
Equation 5: Average growth at year t 
 
 
               
   ∑
                             
              
 
      
  
3.1.3. The elasticity of marginal utility of consumption,   
 
In this subsection, the derivation of this parameter will be explained according to 
Evans and Sezer (2004). The measurement of this component is based on social values 
through personal income tax structures and the formal derivation of e takes into account 
two strong assumptions:  
 
1. Equal absolute sacrifice of satisfaction; and 




As can be seen from the Appendix, the tax-based value of e is determined by a ratio 
of logged variables involving effective marginal and average tax rates.  
 
Equation 6: The elasticity of marginal utility of consumption 
 
  
  𝒈     





 t= effective marginal tax rate of income tax 
 T= total income tax liabilities 
 Y= pre-tax income 
 T/Y= average tax rate 
 
The effective marginal tax rate for Portugal was taken from ec.europa database
13
 
for the years 2005 until 2013. The average tax rate, including both income tax rates and 
employees’ social security contributions, referred to as “all-in tax rates”, were taken 
from OECD database also for the years 2005 until 2013. 
 
3.2. Social Opportunity Cost of Capital, ‘SOCC’ 
 
This method was based on a paper from Young (2002)
 
that does a very good job in 
explaining the opportunity cost of capital. There are three different methods that can be 
used to calculate the SOCC discount rate, however, the one that provides the best 
estimates is CAPM. The equation can be defined as: 
 
Equation 7: CAPM 
                    
                                                          




Where    is the required return on project i,     is the rate of return one can expect on a 
completely riskless asset in Portugal,    is the levered beta, and         is the equity 




Three assumptions were required in order to use the CAPM model, namely, 
(i) The 10-year Portuguese risk-free rate for the years 2005 until 201314; 
(ii) The equity market risk premium (EMRP); 
(iii) The equity beta specific to each PPP sector. 
 
Regarding the first assumption, the 10-year government bond rate was taken from 
Bloomberg Terminal starting from 1999 until the most recent data to give an accurate 
estimate of the risk-free. Then, each risk-free interest rate was calculated for the years 
2005 until 2013 using a simple average of each year. 
Likewise, each equity market risk premium (EMRP) for each year was taken from 
Damodaran database
15
 as well as the unlevered beta for each industry sector and for 
each year. Each sector (transport, health, emergency and security) has a specific beta 
depending on the level of systematic risk it represents. It was assumed that the 22 road 
contracts and the 2 railway contracts provide the same systematic risk, therefore, they 
were considered to have the same beta. This unlevered beta for each sector can be 
converted to equity beta by using the next formula: 
 
Equation 8: Hamada’s formula 
     [  (
 
 
)      ]   
Where    stands for unlevered beta, 
 
 
  was assumed to be the public debt as a 
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 According to the model the appropriate government bond rate is a long-term one. In this situation, the 





 Based on KPMG: Main changes in the Portuguese tax law 2014 
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Furthermore, the cost of equity (    for each PPP sector, between 2005 and 
2013, was calculated using the CAPM equation. However, when taking into account 
that the government does not pay corporate income tax, the formula becomes the 
following: 
 
Equation 9: CAPM after taxes 
    
[         (          )  ]
   
     
 
Where         is the after-tax risk-free rate and (          ) is the after-tax 
market risk premium. 
 
The appropriate rate of return on debt, the public sector’s cost of debt (   , used 
in the WACC equation is simply a long-term government bond rate with a debt 
premium
17
 and the alternative use of those funds. 
Based on the study provided by Young (2002), the SOCC method states that the 
discount rate is given by the WACC
18
 equation, which uses the cost of debt and the cost 
of equity of each PPP sector calculated by the CAPM formula: 
 
Equation 10: WACC 
       
 
 
   
 
 
      
 








corresponding equity structure. 
 
 As a final result, each sector will have its own discount rate which will also 
change from year to year. This is consistent with the CAPM model because it considers 
the systematic risk of each sector. 
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 Weighted-average cost of capital 
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3.3. Weighted average between STPR and SOCC 
 
This method is simply one weighted average between the two previous rates 
calculated. Theoretically, this method implies that each project has a different a, and 
literature
19
 says that there is a problem in setting this parameter. Having computed the 
STPR and SOCC rate, one assumed a weight of 50% for each of the rates: 
 
Equation 11: Weighted Average between STPR and SOCC 
                                  
 





3.4. Long-term government bond rate 
 
3.4.1. Portuguese 10-year bond rate 
 
The 10-year Portuguese Treasury bond used was taken from Bloomberg Terminal 
since 1999 until the most recent date (daily data). Then, the yearly long-term 
government bond rate for years 2005 until 2013 was calculated using a simple average 
of each year: 
Equation 12: Daily Portuguese risk-free 




∑           
 
      
 
Where t is the year (2005-2013), N is the number of trading days in that year and 
   is the government bond rate. 
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 Young (2002) 
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3.4.2. German 10-year bond rate 
 
The 10-year German risk-free rate was considered because it is the safest 
government bond rate across European-Union and was also taken from Bloomberg 
Terminal since 1999 until the most today (daily data). Similarly, the same calculation 





After having computed all the different discount rates, these ones were used to 
compute the NPV of the net payments for the 36 contracts in the years 2005 until 2013, 
using: 
 
Equation 13: Net Present Value of the future payments 
    ∑
                  
       
 
     
 
 In addition, the NPV using the legal rate of the Portuguese Government was 
calculated and compared with the others. The same calculations were done by sector, in 












4. Portuguese context in PPPs 
 
Portugal is one of the leading European countries in PPP usage, with already 36 
PPPs accumulated since 1993 (figure 2). Until the year 2041, there are a serious number 
of net payments due by the State, particularly between 2014 and 2018. The most part of 
these investments relate to road sector PPPs followed by health sector PPPs as can be 
seen in figures 3 and 4 below. 
 








































































































































































Figure 2-Number of PPPs operating in Portugal 
Figure 3- Forecasted future net payments with 
PPPs 2012-2041 
 
Figure 4- Discounted future net payments with 
PPPs 2012-2041 (in € million and as a percentage 





In figure 4, one can see that the discounted net payments in 2013, arising from 
the contracted PPPs with the private consortiums until now, account for approximately 
€ 11.011 million, representing about 6.2% of 2013 GDP. 
 
The Portuguese Government has created PPPs in three sectors: transport (22 
highways and 3 railroads), health (10 hospitals) and security and emergency (1 
infrastructure).  
In the highway sector, the public sector launched 7 projects, between 1999 and 
2001, that became extremely well known and at the same time controversial, the so-
called SCUTs. These ex-SCUTs cover 930km of highways in Portugal and were 
initially financed by shadow-tolls, meaning that the State would pay an agreed amount
20
 
to the private consortiums instead of the users (Sarmento and Renneboog, 2014).  The 
State paid the private party using the taxpayer’s money instead of the traditional tolls. 
Currently, after 2011, this does not happen anymore. The tolling process is nowadays a 
bit bureaucratic. In order to not alter the original contracts, anyone who wants to use 
these highways must pay tolls to the State through the concessionaire. The State 
however continues to pay a fixed amount to the concessionaire. This shifted the demand 
risk totally to the State side. 
In addition, the second wave of highways was created, between 2007 and 2009, 
under the supervision of the national public roads concessionaire, Estradas de Portugal 
(EP). The main reason behind the use of these PPPs lies on the fact that these highways 
were settled in poorer regions with reduced access, and that these facilities would help 
to expand those regions. What was not said was that only 55% of the ex-SCUTS had 
these characteristics, making this one of the aspects that leads to the controversy of this 
subject. 
 
The health sector has also experienced these PPP projects
21
. According to Sarmento 
and Renneboog (2014), these models are complex because each hospital has two 
different PPPs associated: 
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 Band A: a payment of x per vehicle per km for the first (a*1000) vpd (vehicles per day)/km; Band B: a 
payment for y per vehicle per km for the next (b*1000) vpd/km and; Band C: all higher levels of vpd/km-
no payment 
21
 Four hospitals: Braga, Cascais, Loures e Vila Franca de Xira 
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(1) The first one deals with the construction and management of the hospital 
facilities under a 30-year contract with an availability payment; 
 (2) The second PPP manages the clinical services under a 10-year contract with 
payments based on production. 
The last PPP is settled in the security sector since 2006 and corresponds to the 
SIRESP (Redes Digitais de Segurança e Emergência) corresponding to a capital 
expenditure of €126 million.  
 
Why is it important to study the Portuguese case? What contribution can our country 
provide to this field? Obviously, Portugal is not the only EU country to use PPPs to 
provide a public service. Yet, there are some facts that make Portugal one of the best 
cases to analyze: It is responsible for 3% of a total of 1,340 PPP projects in Europe as 
well as 7% of €254 billion of investment. Given that Portugal only accounts for 1% of 
Europe’s GDP, makes it the leading country in using PPPs (Sarmento and Reis, 2012; 
Sarmento and Renneboog, 2014).   
A recent study carried out by the European Investment Bank (2010) shows that 
Portugal was the leading country in using PPPs when considering the capital 
















 According to the State’s budget (2013) data, total gross payments to road sector 
PPPs account for 11.3%
22
 of the current GDP. This case should be seen as an example 
of what should not be done in the future. The only conclusion is that PPPs were mostly 
used to postpone these costs to the future and to benefit current governments (Sarmento 
and Renneboog, 2014). This is seen as another criticism towards PPPs.  
At the time these contracts were introduced, Portugal did not have the required 
expertise to deal with this but it started to invest in a big number of contracts. The 
contracts proved to be of an extreme complexity, which joined with the unaffordable 
future payments led to a series of renegotiations to try to reduce this burden to the State. 
However, every contract that was renegotiated ended up reallocating more risks to the 
public sector and to actually increase future payments.  
Portugal has committed the error to use PPPs before performing any analysis to 
know how much it would cost to the State’s future budgets. Despite many authors 
disagreeing with the use of these partnerships we believe that they can create VfM when 
there is a good risk allocation between the private and the public sector. Here, the 
problem lies on a bad management that did not perform any public sector procurement. 
This case should be made an example of what should not be done in order to create 
value for money in the future. 
 
Since 2003, Portugal has been using a discount rate of 6.08%, based on the 10-year 
Portuguese Treasury bonds, to assess Public-Private Partnerships. Until now, there has 
not been any update to this discount rate and the big question that should be asked is 
why? If this discount rate represents the Portuguese “risk-free” rate in 2003, it denotes 
the Portuguese default risk in 2003, not in 2014. It does not make any sense to use a 
discount rate based on values from 11 years ago and must be updated. 
 Having said this, which discount rate should be used then? If one maintains the 
same methodology, i.e., based on the government bond rate, should not it be a variable 
rate instead? Should not the rate be based on the current year’s government bond rate? 
Certainly, this makes more sense than the previous rate. 
Moreover, what has happened to the State’s payments when the financial crisis started 
to affect Portugal? What consequences did it trigger to use a substantially lower rate 
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 Calculations made by the authors 
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when interest rates reached an all-time high of 17.36% in January 2012? This has had 
impact on the payments. Did the State benefit from this practice? Or has the private 
sector benefit itself from the lack of the government’s experience in this field? 
  In the year of 2012, the payments were being discounted at a 6.08% rate instead 
of 10.60% which, according to this dissertation’s calculations, is the 2012 annual 
government bond rate. As a consequence, when using a lower rate, the NPV of the 
future payments is higher than it should be. Therefore, the Portuguese State was paying 
more to the private sector than they should pay. In this situation, the private sector was 
taking advantage of the situation.  
What could have been done was a rearrangement or negotiation between the 
public and private sectors concerning the discount rate. The public sector, knowing that 
interest rates were higher at that time, should have suggested to the private sector to 
accept a discount rate closer to the values of interest rates. However, if the Government 
asked for a discount rate of 10.60%, it is certain that the other party would not have 
accepted this, because it would brutally lower the payments. But certainly the discount 
rate being used in no matter reflected the true nature of the country risk associated with 
the country. As such by not taking one such offer, the private sector was indeed 
accepting a risk substantially higher.  
But there are additional arguments for the private sector to accept this kind of 
negotiation. As Sarmento and Reis (2012) explain, the private sector was in need for 
cash, so that those companies could deleverage from banks and shareholders who have 
invested in these projects. Therefore, the private sector could have accepted the 7% or 
8% discount rate as they would receive more than if the discount rate were at 10.60%. 
By doing this, the Portuguese Government would not only lower the burden to the fiscal 
consolidation but would also help the Portuguese economy. Even so, nothing was done 
to prevent this problem, which would be solved by a “simple” adjustment in the 
discount rate.  
 
In the literature, Evans (2006) agrees that in the Euro-zone the same ex-ante real bond 
rate applies. The question that arises is whether there should be any “European” 
discount rate for all the Euro-zone governments to use. And if yes, which rate should it 
be? There is some debate as Evans (2006) shows in his paper about whether to base a 
benchmark on the STPR or on the long-term government bond. It seems easier to use 
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market information rather than to calculate all the STPR parameters. Despite this, some 
countries do not use the bond rate as a discount rate.  
In this paper, we believe that a “European” rate on the long-term government bond for 
the Euro-zone countries is not the right way to do it. The problem is that the economies 
are not the same and does not make sense putting Portugal in the same basket as 
German or even France.  
 
5. Results  
 
 
The two following tables present the discount rates derived from the methodology 
and the discounted net PPP payments using those rates.  
Table 2-Five different discount rates calculated using different approaches plus the legal rate
23.
 
Source: made by the authors 
One can notice some variations in the results, mostly in the SOCC method where 
discount rates range from 1.68% to 8.81% in the security sector, which is caused by 
the assumptions present in the methodology. The main cause is the equity beta 
(1.85) calculated using Hamada’s formula which leads to the highest SOCC rate. In 
2012, the drastic decrease in the discount rate is given by the government debt as a 
% of GDP being of 124 % and the risk-free of 10.6%.  The public debt as a % of 
GDP in 2013 increases 5 percentage points to 129% which explains the decrease in 
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 It is worth mentioning that the SOCC and W.Average method provide a different discount rate for each 
PPP sector 
 
Sectors 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
STPR all 5.34% 5.09% 5.13% 5.17% 5.06% 4.99% 5.66% 4.39% 4.42% 
SOC 
road  5.96% 6.80% 8.63% 8.58% 6.32% 5.88% 5.20% 2.45% 2.15% 
railway  5.96% 6.80% 8.63% 8.58% 6.32% 5.88% 5.20% 2.45% 2.15% 
health  7.10% 6.97% 8.20% 7.61% 5.59% 5.47% 6.60% 3.36% 1.74% 
security  8.81% 8.15% 8.54% 8.67% 5.73% 5.57% 6.33% 3.28% 1.68% 
Weighted 
Average 
road  5.65% 5.95% 6.88% 6.87% 5.69% 5.44% 5.43% 3.42% 3.29% 
railway  5.65% 5.95% 6.88% 6.87% 5.69% 5.44% 5.43% 3.42% 3.29% 
health  6.22% 6.03% 6.66% 6.39% 5.32% 5.23% 6.13% 3.88% 3.08% 
security  7.07% 6.62% 6.83% 6.92% 5.39% 5.28% 6.00% 3.84% 3.05% 
YTM POR all  3.54% 3.74% 4.42% 4.51% 4.20% 5.30% 10.17% 10.60% 6.27% 
YTM GER all  3.38% 3.78% 4.23% 4.00% 3.27% 2.78% 2.65% 1.56% 1.56% 
Legal Rate all  6.08% 6.08% 6.08% 6.08% 6.08% 6.08% 6.08% 6.08% 6.08% 
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the SOCC rate in relation to 2012. The Weighted Average method also offers some 
variations which are explained by the 50% effect the SOCC rate has in it. 
 
When it comes to the STPR it shows much more consistency throughout the 
years and has its higher oscillation from 2011 to 2012 because there is a decrease in 
the estimation of the growth of per capital real consumption (g).  According to the 
definition of STPR it makes sense because society prefers to pay less in 2013 to 
receive something in that time than to receive it in the future. 
Table 3- NPV of the 36 PPP future payments with five different discount rates between 2005 and 2013 
(in € million) 
 
The previous table shows the importance that the calculation of the public 
sector’s discount rate has. Additionally, it can be concluded that the NPV is very 
sensitive to a small variation in the discount rate because a deviation of 0.74% between 
the STPR and Legal rate in 2005 amounts to a difference of approximately €838 million 
in total NPV payments. 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
STPR 13.752 € 12.428 € 13.241 € 14.763 € 19.427 € 4.423 € 5.857 € 14.041 € 12.079 € 
SOC 12.686€ 10.963 € 10.507 € 11.850 € 17.534 € 6.171€ 4.874€ 16.931€ 14.083€ 
W.Average 13.198 € 11.659 € 11.732 € 13.163 € 18.673 € 5.378 € 5.376 € 15.875 € 13.009 € 
YTM POR 16.189 € 13.767 € 13.966 € 15.518 € 22.778 € 5.062 € 7.343 € 10.518 € 10.848 € 
YTM GER 16.438 € 13.721 € 14.173 € 16.167 € 23.355 € -3.237 € -304 € 18.319 € 14.607 € 
Legal Rate 12.913 € 11.568 € 12.360 € 13.806 € 17.616 € 6.300 € 6.227 € 13.428 € 11.011 € 




Source: made by the authors 
 
  When analyzing figure 5, there is a steady increase in 2009’s NPV regardless of 
which discount rate used. The reason for this is that the estimated payments take into 
account the following PPPs that have set up the contract in 2008 last trimester: 
Autoestrada Transmontana, Douro Interior, Baixo Tejo, Baixo Alentejo, Litoral Oeste, 
Autoestrada do Centro, Algarve Litoral, Pinhal Interior, Hospital de Braga, Hospital de 
Loures, Hospital de Vila Franca de Xira, Hospital Todos-os-Santos, Hospital Central do 
Algarve and Rede Alta Velocidade (Poceirão-Caia). The impact of 14 new PPPs 
represent an increase to the future payments of €3.000 million to €7.000 million 
depending on the rate used.    
One can notice that when using the German LT Government bond rate there is a 
negative NPV not only in 2010 but also in 2011. As it can also be concluded from table 
3, there is a decrease in NPV terms when compared to other years, although when using 
all the other discount rates this fall is not so high. The explanation for this lies on the 
fact that on the state’s budget (2010) it was estimated that from 2030 onwards the road 
sector concessions and sub concessions, which represent the majority of the investment 
in PPPs, start to generate revenue meaning that the public sector will receive more than 
what it will pay to the road sector concessionaries, inevitably leading to the decrease in 








2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
years 
STPR SOCC W.Average
POR LT Gov Bond GER LT Gov Bond Legal rate
Figure 5-Pattern of the NPV of 36 PPPs payments between 2005 and 2013 using five different discount 




payments being superior to the accumulated revenue mostly because of the final 
negotiation of two hospitals: Lisboa Oriental and Central do Algarve. However, this 
does not happen for the GER LT Bond. The reason is that this approach presents the 
lowest rates in these two years: 2.78% and 2.65% respectively. It is obvious that the 
lower the discount rate used in the NPV equation the higher the NPV will be. 
Conversely, when discounting negative payments the result is the opposite and this 
leads to the negative NPVs.  In addition, there is a decrease in 2011 NPV payments 
when using the SOCC rate and the W.Average rate that does not follow the pattern of 
the other approaches. The reason is that these discount rates are higher in 2011 than in 
2010 and the State’s budget (2011) forecasts benefits (negative payments) from 2030 
on, which causes the opposite effect.  
There is a big increase in the net discounted payments in 2012 when compared 
to the previous year.  Due to the low traffic demand in SCUTS highways estimated in 
2012 there was an increase in the payments to the private sector and since the road 
sector PPPs are responsible for the biggest impact on the future payments it had this 
effect in the NPV. 
When analyzing the year 2013 it is observable a decrease in the NPV of the net 
payments that can be explained by the renegotiations that the Government has done and 
is going to do in the following years with the private sector. These renegotiations 
estimate a reduction in the future payments by availability, which therefore decreases 
the NPV. However, when using the Portuguese LT Gov. Bond for 2013 there is an 
increase in the NPV because there is a reduction of more than 4% in the discount rate. 
 If using the Portuguese LT Gov. Bond rate instead of the official (even legal) 
rate there are significant differences in the NPV for the years 2005 and 2009. It would 
be expected that in these years the difference in discount rates would be the highest. In 
fact, in 2009 they differ only 1.88%, which is not that much comparing with other years. 
In 2012 this difference in discount rates accounts for 4.52%, the maximum between 
these two rates and, it “only” causes the difference of approximately €3.000 million in 
NPV terms. It was expected that in 2011 the NPV differed much more than in 2009 but 
the road sector PPPs start to generate revenue according to 2011 State’s budget and the 
difference in NPV terms decreases. 
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In 2010, 2012 and 2013 if one used this Portuguese yield to maturity the 
conclusion would be that fewer funds would have been provided for these projects. 
 
Table 4-Discounted future net payments with PPPs as a % of Portugal GDP (in € millions) and 
difference between the current practice in the Government 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average 
STPR 9,222% 7,995% 8,121% 8,870% 11,875% 2,670% 3,474% 8,670% 6,811% 7,523% 
 
0,562% 0,553% 0,540% 0,575% 1,107% -1,133% -0,219% 0,878% 0,602% 0,385% 
SOC 8,507% 7,053% 6,444% 7,120% 10,718% 3,725% 2,892% 9,825% 7,941% 7,136% 
 
-0,152% -0,389% -1,137% -1,175% -0,050% -0,077% -0,802% 2,033% 1,732% -0,002% 
W.Average 8,851% 7,500% 7,196% 7,909% 11,414% 3,246% 3,189% 9,213% 7,335% 7,317% 
 
0,192% 0,058% -0,385% -0,386% 0,646% -0,556% -0,504% 1,421% 1,127% 0,179% 
YTM POR 10,856% 8,857% 8,565% 9,324% 13,924% 3,055% 4,356% 6,104% 6,116% 7,906% 
 
2,197% 1,415% 0,985% 1,029% 3,155% -0,747% 0,662% -1,688% -0,092% 0,768% 
YTM GER 11,023% 8,827% 8,692% 9,714% 14,276% -1,954% -0,180% 10,630% 8,236% 7,696% 
 
2,363% 1,385% 1,111% 1,419% 3,508% -5,756% -3,874% 2,838% 2,027% 0,558% 
Legal Rate 8,659% 7,442% 7,581% 8,295% 10,768% 3,803% 3,694% 7,792% 6,209% 7,138% 
Source: made by the authors 
 
One of the purposes of this study is to compare all the other approaches with the 
current practice in Portugal not only in terms of the methodology and assumptions 
behind it, but also in the effect they have in the NPV. Similarly, it is interesting to see 
the effect each discount rate has in the country’s public debt. By looking at the previous 
table, results of the impact of future payments on Portugal’s GDP are presented.  
 If one used the YTM POR instead of the legal rate these future payments would 
represent a higher burden to the State, except in 2010, 2012 and 2013. The SOCC 
method and the legal rate are the ones that represent an average smaller burden to the 
State representing 7.136% and 7.138%, respectively. 
The values presented in red show the difference in terms of weight as a 
percentage of GDP between the NPVs using each discount rate and the legal rate. 
Results confirm that all the others except for the SOCC method have a higher impact in 
the Portuguese GDP. This means that using the SOCC method yields an average better 




However, does this mean that the SOCC method should be the one used in the 
Portuguese Government? Not necessarily. Which discount rate should be used then?  
In this paper, we partially agree with the approach used by the Portuguese 
Government, in the sense that, it should be based on the long-term government bond. 
Future payments to PPPs must be treated as public debt and as such the long-term 
government bond should be used. This rate should be used to discount PPPs’ future 
payments. However, according to the literature review, it is clear to us that the discount 
rate used to assess PPPs should not reflect the project-specific risk but systematic risk or 
market risk. The CAPM should be used to estimate this risk. Therefore, the discount 
rate would be the treasury’s bond rate adjusted for systematic risk. The problem is not 
risk but uncertainty. Hence, a sensitivity analysis should be done to account for this. 
Major assumptions in the discount rate should be varied to minimize uncertainty.  
When writing each PPP contract, after analyzing whether it is the most effective 
way to provide the service, the allocation of risks, between each party, must be taken 
into account so that the risk profile can be estimated. This update should be done in an 
early basis. As these projects have long maturities, we strongly believe that the discount 
rate should give less weight to future costs than to present costs. In this sense, DDRs 
should be applied for periods longer than 30 years, as the HM Treasury (2003) suggests. 
The nature of the cash-flows is different in a traditional public procurement 
contract. Consequently, when it comes to the PSC, we agree that the discount rate 
should be based only on the risk-free rate. The reason is that there is a difference in the 
cash-flows’ risks. The cost of building an infrastructure by the public sector is not 
equivalent to the payments due to the PPP. The risk-free rate used should be updated 












This dissertation has five main goals. The first is to gather literature on discount 
rates used by governments and public entities to assess PPP projects. Second, the most 
used discount rate models are described. These approaches are: the Social Time 
Preference rate (STPR), the Social Opportunity Cost of Capital (SOCC), a weighted 
average between the STPR and SOCC, and the long-term government bond. Third, the 
comparison among different country approaches is analyzed, as well as the implications 
of their usage in Portugal. To analyze these implications, several discount rates were 
calculated for the Portuguese public sector to use in PPPs, using these commonly 
known methods in the literature, for the years 2005 until 2013. In addition, these 
discount rates were used to discount the future payments regarding the 36 PPPs 
currently operating in Portugal. The NPVs were analyzed across methodologies and 
across years. Amongst the results, it should be emphasized that a smaller variation in 
the discount rate can drastically alter the present value of the debt associated with the 
PPPs. In 2009, the impact of 14 new PPPs represents an increase to the future payments 
of €3.000 million to €7.000 million, depending on the discount rate used. On the 
following year, there is a considerable fall in the future payments’ NPV because 
according to the State’s Budget (2010), road concessions start to generate revenue. Due 
to low traffic projections in road sector PPPs, there is an intensification of future 
payments in 2012, as these represent the majority of weight on the country’s GDP. 
According to the State’s budget (2013) data, total gross payments to road concessions 
account for 11.3% of its GDP. Also, if the SOCC method was used, the burden to the 
State would have been the lowest one, even when compared to the legal rate. 
Furthermore, this study addresses the most debated topic in PPPs: future payments. 
The real problem lies in Portugal being the number one in using PPPs across Europe 
when considering capital expenditure as a % of GDP, according to European Investment 
Bank (2010). At the beginning, when these projects were still quite unknown, Portugal 
did not have the know-how to deal with this type of contracts, known to be extremely 
complex. It has signed contracts without knowing how much it would cost in the future, 
postponing costs into the future only to benefit current governments. Today, future 
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payments have achieved massive amounts leading to several renegotiations with 
concessionaries. The most questioned example refers to the SCTUS highways. These 
highways, which had shadow tolls paid by the government, were going to make the 
access easier in poorer regions of the country. However, there was a need to renegotiate 
terms and the public sector ended up paying more than it should. 
This is why the Portuguese case is so interesting to study as it is a good example of 
what should not be done. Hopefully, all of this was seen as an example but still, the 
recommendation that we want to stress out is that a risk analysis, as well as a VfM test, 
must be performed before entering in any contract. 
Moreover, there has been some discussion on whether the current Portuguese 
practice is correct, when it comes to the discount rate used to assess PPPs.  
Since 2003, Portugal has set its discount rate at 6.08%, based on 2003’s 
government bond rate. The problem is not the approach used, but the lack of an update 
as it does not represent the country’s current default risk.  
During the most recent financial crisis, the country’s risk-free reached values of 
17% while the government maintained the rate at 6.08%. This means that the private 
sector was receiving more than it should, since a lower rate yield a higher NPV. It is 
clear that the Government was having a higher burden with PPP payments and should 
have intervened. Seeing that interest rates were higher at the time, it should have 
suggested the private sector to renegotiate the discount rate in order to lower the burden. 
The public sector could have argued for a discount rate of, for example, 8% which was 
still lower than the annual risk-free of 10.60%. The private sector would have agreed 
with this renegotiation because, even that they would be paid less than with 6.08%, they 
would still be better than with 10.60%. Why would they accept to renegotiate the 
discount rate? Simply because they would be able to pay the debt they owed to 
commercial banks and shareholders. In this sense, the Government not only would have 
lowered the weight of future payments, but would also inject some money in the 
Portuguese economy. 
This is why the Portuguese practice is not the right one and we propose a discount 
rate that seems far more appropriate. 
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 When discounting PPP payments, the current Portuguese approach is not 
inappropriate in our opinion. However, instead of a fixed rate based on the long-term 
government bond, a variable rate should be used. This rate is also the government bond 
of that year, updated in an early basis, adjusted for systematic risk. Future payments to 
PPPs must be seen as public debt therefore, the risk-free rate is the appropriate rate. It 
should be adjusted for market risk because each project has a different risk profile and 
moves differently with the market, hence, the Government must account for this. 
Furthermore, if the project is built entirely by the public sector, the discount rate used 
should be the risk-free rate only. When considering long-term projects, such as PPPs, 
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The derivation of equation 8 is presented here, starting with these two assumptions: 
 
Equation A: Equal absolute sacrifice of satisfaction 
      (      )         
 
Equation B: Iso-elastic utility function 
    
         
   
   
 
Equation A reflects equal absolute sacrifice, in which the income tax taken from 
individuals involves the same sacrifice of utility for all taxpayers regardless of their 
income level. Equation B is an iso-elastic utility function assumed to apply to all 
Exhibit 2- Social discount rate determination 
Exhibit 3- Income Tax Model based on Equal Absolute Sacrifice 
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individuals. In economics, an iso-elastic function has a constant elasticity which 
represents the ration of the percentage change in the dependent variable to the 
percentage causative change in the independent variable, in the limit when the changes 
approach zero.  
 When substituting equation B into equation A, the result is the following 
equation, 
 
        
   
  
[(      )
   
  ]
   
     
 After taking the total differential of the previous equation gives, 
 
   [       ]              
And after simplifications, 
      [  
 
 
]     
Finally, taking logs in this last equation gives, 
 
e=
  𝒈     




















Exhibit 3- NPV of the road sector PPPs payments between 2005 and 2013 using 
five different discount rate (in € million) 
 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
STPR 9.129 € 8.727 € 9.982 € 10.794 € 13.881 € -3.155 € 157 € 10.423 € 8.623 € 
SOC 8.639 € 7.734 € 7.787 € 8.449 € 12.240 € -943 € -583 € 11.948 € 10.135 € 
W. Average 8.879 € 8.207 € 8.765 € 9.497 € 13.022 € -1.960 € -197 € 11.140 € 9.325 € 
YTM POR 10.831 € 9.659 € 10.558 € 11.371 € 15.198 € -2.289 € 3.210 € 7.291 € 7.665 € 
YTM GER 11.005 € 9.627 € 10.723 € 11.868 € 16.840 € -12.820 € -7.817 € 12.782 € 10.612 € 



















2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
STPR SOCC
Average between STPR and SOCC POR LT Gov Bond
GER LT Gov Bond Legal rate
Exhibit 4- Pattern of the NPV of the road sector PPPs payments between 2005 and 
2013 using five different discount rate (in € million) 
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Exhibit 5- NPV of the health sector PPPs payments between 2005 and 2013 using 























2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
STPR SOCC
Average between STPR and SOCC POR LT Gov Bond
GER LT Gov Bond Legal rate
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
STPR 4.486 € 3.591 € 2.754 € 3.752 € 4.991 € 4.694 € 4.291 € 3.077 € 2.994 € 
SOC 3.913 € 3.123 € 2.292 € 3.197 € 4.757 € 4.518 € 3.999 € 3.250 € 3.427 € 
W. Average 4.184 € 3.344 € 2.504 € 3.456 € 4.872 € 4.605 € 4.140 € 3.161 € 3.195 € 
YTM POR 5.218 € 3.998 € 2.884 € 3.927 € 7.004 € 4.577 € 3.158 € 2.330 € 2.758 € 
YTM GER 5.292 € 3.984 € 2.921 € 4.077 € 5.936 € 5.690 € 5.556 € 3.605 € 3.463 € 
Legal Rate 4.230 € 3.331 € 2.594 € 3.527 € 4.556 € 4.310 € 4.157 € 2.830 € 2.801 € 
Exhibit 6- Pattern of the NPV of the health sector PPPs payments between 2005 




Exhibit 7- NPV of the emergency and security sector PPPs payments between 2005 
and 2013 using five different discount rate (in € million) 
 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
STPR 0 € 0 € 421 € 187 € 408 € 381 € 371 € 421 € 326 € 
SOC 0 € 0 € 347 € 174 € 394 € 371 € 362 € 443 € 358 € 
W. Average 0 € 0 € 381 € 180 € 401 € 376 € 367 € 431 € 341 € 
YTM POR 0 € 0 € 439 € 189 € 427 € 376 € 316 € 326 € 307 € 
YTM GER 0 € 0 € 445 € 191 € 427 € 420 € 419 € 481 € 360 € 
Legal Rate 0 € 0 € 398 € 183 € 387 € 364 € 365 € 390 € 311 € 
 
 




Exhibit 8- Pattern of the NPV of the emergency and security sector PPPs payments 













2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
STPR SOCC
Average between STPR and SOCC POR LT Gov Bond
GER LT Gov Bond Legal rate
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Exhibit 9- NPV of the railway sector PPPs payments between 2005 and 2013 using 
five different discount rate (in € million) 
 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
STPR 136,28 € 109,11 € 83,97 € 30,83 € 146,87 € 2.503,24 € 1.037,66 € 1.020,89 € 135,73 € 
SOC 134,97 € 107,60 € 81,79 € 29,96 € 143,14 € 2.224,99 € 1.096,92 € 1.289,66 € 163,41 € 
W. Average 135,62 € 108,34 € 82,85 € 30,38 € 378,57 € 2.357,66 € 1.066,64 € 1.143,00 € 148,53 € 
YTM POR 140,28 € 110,37 € 84,44 € 31,00 € 149,51 € 2.398,70 € 658,41 € 571,80 € 118,45 € 
YTM GER 140,65 € 110,33 € 84,57 € 31,15 € 152,45 € 3.473,29 € 1.538,17 € 1.451,36 € 172,20 € 
Legal Rate 134,72 € 108,22 € 83,36 € 30,59 € 143,84 € 2.170,34 € 989,13 € 852,83 € 120,70 € 
 




Exhibit 10- Pattern of the NPV of the railway sector PPPs payments between 2005 
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